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Abstract—This paper provides an overview of the Self-
Sovereign Identity (SSI) concept, focusing on four different
components that we identified as essential to the architecture.
Self-Sovereign Identity is enabled by the new development
of blockchain technology. Through the trustless, decentralised
database that is provided by a blockchain, classic Identity
Management registration processes can be replaced.
We start off by giving a simple overview of blockchain based SSI,
introducing an architecture overview as well as relevant actors
in such a system. We further distinguish two major approaches,
namely the Identifier Registry Model and its extension the Claim
Registry Model.
Subsequently we discuss identifiers in such a system, presenting
past research in the area and current approaches in SSI in the
context of Zooko’s Triangle. As the user of an SSI has to be
linked with his digital identifier we also discuss authentication
solutions.
Most central to the concept of an SSI are the verifiable claims
that are presented to relying parties. Resources in the field are
only losely connected. We will provide a more coherent view of
verifiable claims in regards to blockchain based SSI and clarify
differences in the used terminology.
Storage solutions for the verifiable claims, both on- and off-chain,
are presented with their advantages and disadvantages.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology has experienced tremendous hype
in recent years and is touted as a transformative evolution in
distributed systems [1]. Satoshi Nakamoto is seen as father
of the technology for introducing Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer
electronic cash system [2]. By applying the concept of
trustless timestamping proposed by Haber and Stornetta [3]
to a decentralised setting and combining it with a chain of
Proof-of-Work [4] [5] the so called Nakamoto consensus
protocol was established.
The computational resources invested in the Proof-of-Work
solutions are equivalent to votes on the correct version
of the blockchain, so as long as more than 50% of the
computational resources are in control of honest nodes, an
eventual consistency can be achieved [6].
This decentralised consensus protocol has seen application in
numerous fields, one of them identity mangement.
The management of identites has also experienced increased
interest due to the ever growing need of digital identites,
as a large part of peoples lifes is spent online, interacting
with services. A digital identity can be simply described as a
means for people to prove electronically that they are who
they say they are and distinguish different entities from one
another.
Although the term “Self-Sovereign Identity” (SSI) is still
only loosely defined, a few key properties of the concept
have emerged. In essence it is an identity management
system which allows individuals to fully own and manage
their digital identity. The W3C working group on verifiable
claims states that in a self-sovereign identity system users
exist independently from services [7]. This highlights the
contrast to current identity management which either relies
on a number of large identity providers such as Facebook
(Facebook Connect) and Google (Google Sign-In) or the user
has to create new digital identities at each individual service
provider.
Christopher Allen proposed Ten Principles of Self-Sovereign
Identity [8] which layed out the requirements for a system
implementing the self-sovereign identity concept. These
Principles were further grouped into the three categories
security, controllability, and portability in a whitepaper by
the Sovrin Foundation [9] as pictured in Figure 1.
Security Controllability Portability
Protection Existence Interoperability
Persistance Control Transparency
Minimisation Consent Access
Figure 1. Christopher Allen’s Ten Principles of Self-Sovereign Identity
summarised by the Sovrin Foundation [9]
Essentially security can be boiled down to the protection
of personal user data and the limiting of data exposure to
the minimum required to fulfill a function. Additionally a
persistent identity was named as a security requirement.
Persistence in this context however should not contradict
a “right to be forgotten” according to Allen. This right to
be forgotten could also be grouped into the controllability
category as both control and consent should extend to the
removal of the identity not only the creation and access.
Another essential requirement for an SSI system is the
portability of the identity. Allowing the user to use their
identity wherever they want and being independent of any
particular identity provider.
Although there are a large number of projects and initiatives
concentrated on Self-Sovereign Identity, both the terminology
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Figure 2. Self-Sovereign Identity Actors
and understanding of architectures differs widely.
New innovations come primarely from private ventures or
individuals volunteering in working groups. While this leads
to a lot of interest in the wider public, the documentation of
such ideas is either very practical or only for advertisement
purposes limiting their scientific usefulness.
This paper’s objective is to give an overview and deeper
understanding of the concept of SSI as well as the current
state of the art. For this purpose we will look at four basic
components needed in a Self-Sovereign Identity system.
Before we start going into detail about the different
components we will first provide a high level overview of
the Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) Architecture. After this
general overview in Section II we will present the essential
components of such a system, starting with the identifier to be
chosen for identities in the system in Section III. Further the
authentication of the identity will be discussed in Section IV.
The concept of verifiable claims and their integral role in the
SSI system as well as the possibility for reputation systems
will be reviewed in Section V. For privacy and scalability
considerations we will also discuss storage approaches for
use in a Self-Sovereign Identity system in Section VI.
II. SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY ARCHITECTURE
In contrast to most previous identity management systems
where the service provider was at the center of the identity
model, SSI is user centric. In Figure 2 the relation between
the different actors of the system can be observed. The claim
issuer issues (at least part of) the identity by attesting to
certain attributes of the user. This identity is controlled by
the user himself. Any relying party that needs to identify the
user will be presented with the parts of the user controlled
identity relevant to him. In order to accept the identity, the
relying party needs to have a trustful relationship with the
claim issuer.
The basis of this new architecture type is the distributed
ledger of the blockchain. In Figure 3 the relation between the
different components of a typical SSI architecture are layed
out. The blockchain acts as replacement for the registration
authority in classic identity mangement systems. In this paper
we will call this blockchain function the identifier registry.
Here the pairing of identification and authentication is
maintained. The identifier as well as the verifiable claims
are directly managed by the user.
The identifier is tied to the specific user by use of an
authentication method such as asymmetric cryptography. By
establishing a pairing of identifier and public key on the
blockchain the identifier can be verified by anyone reading
the blockchain by posing a challenge to the user himself or a
delegate of the user.
A distinction can be made between subject and holder in
some cases, i.e guardians to underaged individuals or attorney
client relations. In the following we will, for simplicity,
assume that the holder is indeed the subject of any claims
and will refer to him as user.
The actual identity claim is stored in the user controlled
storage, typically off-chain for privacy considerations. The
relying party, also called claim-verifier, can then compare the
publicely available identifier with the identifier in the claim
that has been handed to him by the user. After authenticating
the user with the authentication method presented in the
public blockchain, the claim itself can be verified and
accepted or rejected by the relying party.
We will describe this architecture as Identifier Registry
Model. A very popular competing model can be described
as Claim Registry Model. In that model the blockchain not
only functions as a registry for the identifiers of an identity
but also to hold the cryptographic fingerprints of all the
associated claims of an identity. This model can be seen as
an extension to the Identifier Registry Model.
In this process no information about the user has to be stored
at either the issuer or the verifier. Only the trust between
the issuer and verifier has to be established beforehand. As
described in this section, the SSI architecture relies on the
mapping of an identifier to a specific authentication method
that is recorded on the blockchain. In the next two sections
we will discuss how this identifier and its namespace is
chosen as well as the authentication methods used.
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Figure 3. Self-Sovereign Identity Architecture
III. IDENTIFICATION
Bryce Wilcox-O’Hearn published a widely cited article
on namespaces in computer systems in 2001. In it he layed
out what is now known as Zooko’s Triangle [10]. According
to his assessement it was impossible (or highly unlikely)
that someone would be able to design a system in which
identifiers could be chosen in a distributed fashion but at the
same time being both secure and human-readable.
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Figure 4. Zooko’s Triangle
In this context distributed means without the need for a
central registration and verification process, while secure
refers to the identifiers being securely unique (collision free).
The identifiers that are presented in this section can be
grouped into three different categories. Firstly the identifiers
based on random number generation that rely on probabilities
to avoid collisions. Secondly the centralised identifiers that
utilise a registration authority in order to assign identifiers and
prevent collisions. Finally we will discuss how the blockchain
technology can help merge the best aspects of both these
approaches.
Already in the 1980s the need for a globally unique identifier
became apparent [11]. The Universally Unique Identifier
(UUID or GUID) [12] does not require a central registration
process but rather lets users generate their own identifiers,
therefore partially fulfilling the decentralisation requirement
formulated by Zooko’s Triangle. In the UUID versions 1 and
2 the uniqueness is guaranteed by inlcuding node specific
information such as the users MAC address which are, unless
tampered with, uniquely assigned by the manufacturer of
the network card and the IEEE registration authority [13].
This means in those versions there is still a centralised
compononent while version 4 is using large random or
pseudo-random numbers to avoid collisions. There are a
total of 2122 possible version 4 UUIDs making a collision,
assuming no implementation errors, highly unlikely to the
point that it can be ignored [14]. This means UUIDs can be
considered secure in this context and do not require a central
registration authority. Apart from being non-human readable
in the sense that no human could realisticly remember specific
UUIDs, they are also not completely decentralised as the
verification process of key-value pairs using UUIDs typically
requires a trusted third party for verification.
This is where public/private key pairs hold a significant
advantage over UUIDs as identifiers in an SSI. In contrast to
a UUID a public/private key pair would not require a trusted
third party for verification as it is self-authenticating.
A distinction between self-authenticating and non-self-
authenticating key-value pairs helps in understanding Zooko’s
argument. Self-authenticating schemes such as secure hash
algorithms or public/private keypairs can create key-value
pairs collision free (to current knowledge) and verify them
without third party input but are typically non-human readable
identifiers.
In non-self-authenticating schemes however there needs to
be trust placed in a third party, assigning and verifying the
name-value pairs.
Although the public-private key pair used in a X.509
certificate is self-authenticating, the mapping of a human
readable Distinguished Name to a specific public key is not.
For this mapping a centralised Certificate Authority has to
be trusted to correctly assign and store the pairing of name
and public key. This centralisation carries significant risk
though. Either through attacks [15] or coercion [16] the
central authority can be compromised.
However, even more decentralised solutions such as PGP [17]
that do not rely on central entities for verification defacto
utilise a quasi-centralised approach to assign human readable
identifiers by using email-addresses. These are issued by
a number of centralised providers that ultimately rely on
ICANN to assign domain names without collisions.
Up until this point, Zooko’s Triangle hypothesis held up.
Either identifiers were not human readable or part of the
decentralisation requirement was not fulfilled. From 2011
on a number of name services on the blockchain appeared,
“squaring” Zooko’s Triangle. With the distributed ledger
technology it is possible to choose a human-readable
identifier in a decentralised fashion as well as assign and
verify name-value pairs without third party input.
In contrast to previous decentralised human-readable
namespaces (i.e. as initially used in Freenet [18]) that
were unsafe, the consensus protocol of the blockchain and
the global view of the system can guarantee that once a
name-value pair has been established it can not be changed
without the correct authentication and most importantly the
same identifier can’t be assigned more than once. As there
is no central authority assigning name-value pairs however,
there need to be other mechanisms.
The first name service built on Bitcoin called Namecoin
[19] as well as a later competitor Emercoin [20] used first
come first serve logic to assign name-value pairs. This
policy however causes problems such as squatting of names,
which was further escalated by the lack of centralised
control. Kalodner et al. found in their study of the Namecoin
namespace design that of the 120,000 registered domain
names, only 28 were not squatted or had non-trivial content
[21]. They argue that because the names are human readable
they are naturally scarce and will therefore hold some market
value compared to the essentially infinite non-human readable
identifiers such as hashes of keys or the public key to a
private key.
Carl Ellison stated in his 1996 paper on Establishing Identity
Without Certification Authorities that “it is clear that there is
no such thing as a universal, global name space with names
meaningful to all possible users and that there never will be”
[22]. Ellison reasoned that there are simply too many names
for a human to remember and attach meaning to.
These assessements were utilised by the Ethereum
Nameservice (ENS) [23] which implemented a decentralised
bidding process to reduce the problem of squatters.
The Self-Sovereign Identity system uPort [24] uses an
Ethereum smart contract address as persistent identifier for
a users identity. The address is derived from the public key
of the creator of the smart contract. Since this identifier is
non-human readable, Christian Lundkvist of uPort sees ENS
as a viable naming layer to map the non-human readable
uPort ID to a human readable address [25]. Blockstack [26]
similarely uses its blockchain Name System to implement a
naming service with human readable names that a Blockstack
identity can be linked to for their system.
W3C decentralised identifiers [27] can be seen as an even
higher level naming scheme, similar to URNs. They resulted
from an effort by a number of working groups investigating
decentralised name systems. A decentralised identifier
(DID) is comprised of a scheme as well as a method and
method specific identifier. The method closely resembles the
namespace component of an URN. Each distinct blockchain
or rather each identity registry (there can be multiple per
blockchain, i.e uPort, Civic [28], SelfKey [29] all operate on
Ethereum) constitutes its own namespace while the blockchain
specific identifiers such as a uPort ID or ENS name specify
the actual identity addressed by the DID. An example for
such a DID path would be: did:examplechain:123456789
The Decentralized Identity Foundation is developing a
universal resolver for these DID paths. Currently Sovrin
[30], Bitcoin [2], Blockstack [26], uPort [24], Interplanetary
Identifiers [31], and Veres One [32] are supported by the
resolver with implemented drivers. The resolver uses the
method type to decide which driver to use and uses the
method specific identifier to resolve to the DID document
stored on the specified Blockchain. The DID document or its
equivalent in other systems is the key to the decentralised
identity.
In it the authentication method is defined to bind the specified
identifier to an identity that is in control of a secret key or
other data used in the authentication.
IV. AUTHENTICATION
In a Self-Sovereign Identity system authentication is
typically done with the use of a public/private key pair
where the public key is stored as value of the identifier
on the blockchain. This concept has been described as
Decentralised Public Key Infrastructure [33] [34]. Thanks
to the zero knowledge proof properties of the asymmetric
cryptography it is possible to prove that a given user is indeed
in control of the identity with the public key stored on the
blockchain. Most popular Self-Sovereign Identity systems use
a asymmetric cryptography authentication protocol.
This poses the question of how the user should hold the
private key associated with his key pair. Blockstack uses
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Figure 5. Relation between components in a verifiable claim
probably the simplest solution where the keys are stored
with the device that the identity was created on and the user
himself is responsible for key recovery and mobility. To
make this process somewhat more usable mnemonic phrases,
typically of 12 words, are used as seed to generate the keys.
Using those phrases it is possible to recreate the private key,
reducing the effort needed to move keys from one system to
the other.
The most used solution in the space currently however is
utilising smartphones for key storage. This has the advantage
of being more portable than other solutions. The challenge
that is being posed by the relying party is communicated to
the smartphone via a QR code displayed on the login page
and the response directly sent from the smartphone to the
designated endpoint. This visual communication removes
the need for physical connections and therefore hardware
support that would be needed for alternative mobile solutions
such as SmartCards. David Chadwick already stated in 1999
that “smart cards are beneficial in some scenarios [...] in
some user environments, the costs and inconveniences clearly
outweigh the potential benefits of using smart cards” [35].
Especially the need to equip workstations with card readers
was seen as a major hinderence.
This is however not the only way authentication on the
blockchain can be realised. Buldas et al. from Guardtime
proposed a hash sequence authentication method for use
in their blockchain system [36]. Their aim was to make
their infrastructure more quantum computing resistant under
the assumption that hash functions would stay secure in
a quantum computing environment. The concept of hash
sequence authentication has first been proposed by Lamport
in 1981 [37].
Another authentication method that has seen interest is the use
of biometric systems. However most biometric cryptosystems
need biometric dependent information (helper data) which
could potentially reveal significant information about the
original biometric template [38].
The W3C DID working group proposes the use of external
biometric services in combination with a cryptographic hash
of the biometric templates.
In theory any authentication method could be used through
an identification service endpoint as defined in the W3C
Verifiable Claims Working Group specification draft [39],
however a self-authenticating method such as public key
cryptography or hash sequences do not need to rely on
any third party endpoints, eliminating yet another point of
centralisation.
As the authentication in such a case relies on a secret held
by the end-user it would be beneficial to provide him with a
way for key recovery/replacement. In the DID scheme this is
done by seperating authentication from authorisation allowing
others to also change the DID document, i.e. changing the
authentication key after the private key was lost.
uPort uses a quorum based key recovery where the holder
logic includes a way for previously selected delegates to vote
on replacing the public/private key pair of the user.
Key recovery seems to be a necessity for a working SSI
system, since key losses are inevitable as the experience from
bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies shows. In Bitcoin’s case
up to a quarter of all current coins have been lost due to
unrecoverable private keys [40].
V. VERIFIABLE CLAIMS
At the center of the Self-Sovereign Identity concept lay the
verifiable claims. The first clarification that is neccesary in this
context is between a claim and a verifiable claim. A claim in
itself is only a statement about a specific subject. A credential,
which some differentiate from claims [41], describes a number
of claims together with their meta data such as issuer and
validity period.
Verifiable claims are verifiable through a signature of an
attestation issuer that has either issued the claim himself or
can attest the correctness of it. An attestation can be seen as
a proof in form of a signature attesting to a certain claim and
meta data needed for verification such as name, validity period
and signature scheme.
The verifiable claims themselves have to be associated with
a subject, typically by including the subject identifier. This
can be observed in Figure IV where the relation of different
components and actors in a verifiable claim is shown. In addi-
tion to the subject, a verifiable claim should hold information
about one or more actual claims as well as some meta data.
The claim is issued by exactly one claim issuer. Similar to
X.509 certificates meta data in a verifiable claim could include
a validity period, the identity of the issuer and algorithms
used for signature/encryption. To make the claim verifiable and
trustable, the issuer has to sign the claim with a well known
key. This is shown in Figure IV where each claim can have
multiple attestations and each attestation has one attestator.
There are mainly two different ways for claims and attestations
to be linked to a users identity. uPort which operates on the
Ethereum network utilises smart contracts to keep a registry
for claims on the blockchain. In the registry they maintain a
mapping of user to hashes of claims that are stored off-chain.
Through this fingerprint the integrity of a claim can be verified
by relying parties. More specifially the timestamping property
of the blockchain is utilised to prevent secret modification
of a claim and its signature. This architecture however only
allows the user to add new claims to his identifier unless
a more complex access management is implemented for the
uPort registry. A registry model inspired by the uPort registy
is being standardised in the Ethereum Improvement Proposal
(EIP) ERC780 [42]. In the proposed Ethereum Claims Registry
the writing of claims is not limited to the owner of the identity
but issuers can directly add new claims and also revoke them
in the registry.
The W3C VCWG data model on the other hand does not
utilise a claim registry. They only rely on the blockchain
for the mapping between an identifier and an authentication
method. By including the identifier in the claim and having
the issuer sign it, already secures against tampering from
outside sources, however not against tampering by the issuer
of whoever holds the signing key of the issuer. When colluding
with the holder of the verifiable claim changes to the claim
would go undetected and backdating or similar attacks could
be done.
However, W3C’s approach is very privacy preserving in the
fact that not even the existence of new claims can be derived
from blockchain changes but it also doesn’t leverage the block-
chains ability to trustfully timestamp items. Claims that have
been altered after first issuance would need to be updated in
the uPort registry, which would be recorded on the blockchain,
protecting against tampering by the claims issuer or anyone in
control of the singing key.
Another advantage that the registry model provides is the
ease of revocation. As there is a “central” (but physically
decentralised) location for all claims it would be possible to
extend the registry with a revocation mechanism.
In comparison to current service centric/centralised identity
solutions a relying party does not have to only trust a
single issuance of a claim. Rather through the aggregation
of multiple attestations for a claim, a more overarching and
more decentralised trust model can be formed. This allows
for relying parties to employ their own local confidence
in certain attestators, depending on their individual relation.
Working systems such as uPort which have their first real
world applications [43] [44], although designed to support
such reputation aggregation, so far only utilise the SSI as a
way for single attestation claim verification in practice.
On a slightly higher level there is also the PGP like aggregation
of multiple claims, not only attestations, which can be used to
form a reputation model for an identity.
VI. STORAGE
A. Public
Although most data in SSI is stored off-chain some of
the data is essential to have on-chain. Most importantly the
already mentioned authentication such as a public key is
typically included in a public fashion. In the end it is up to
the user’s disgression to decide what information he wants to
publicly reveal and what he wants to control more closely.
Both Blockstack and uPort have public profiles which not
only include signing keys but also names and profile pictures.
Especially Blockstack provides use-cases for public disclosure
of information. Specifically social media accounts or PGP keys
that need to be publicly available to realise their full potential
are data that can be securely stored on the blockchain.
B. Private
In a lot of cases a user does not want to disclose claims
about himself though. In most cases the privacy of the user
has to be preserved. For this purpose most claims are stored
off-chain not publicly available and either secured by the
previously discussed claim registry model or simply linked
by the identifier defined in the identifier registry.
Just as the public disclose of information, the user is also in
control of where to store the claims. The most trustless way
would be in a directly user controlled environment such as
hardware in possession of the user. One such example would
be the SelfKey project which utilises a users smartphone to
store claims. This however poses some serious problems too.
Namely data security both against data loss and data theft.
The lack of data redundancy when locally storing claims on
mobile devices as well as the security of the device itself
have to be taken into consideration.
Blockstack on the other hand opted for centralised storage
providers such as Amazon S3, Dropbox and Google Drive
[26]. This helps prevent potential data loss as these systems
are highly redundant. To minimise the impact of attacks on
these systems, they are used in conjunction with each other,
spreading the claim data over multiple providers.
Through the use of decentralised storage systems such as
IPFS [45] uPort wants to minimise the reliance on centralised
entities even more. IPFS is a peer-to-peer distributed
file system based on distributed hash table technology and
is only one example of decentralised storage a user can utilise.
VII. FUTURE WORK
As we have hinted at in Section V, we consider the
possibility for a reputation system for each individual claim an
interesting future topic. Through the aggregation of multiple
attestations, as well as weighting of different attestations a
more complex than binary claim reputation might be realised.
In the same vain as a reputation model for a verifiable claim,
the reputation for the identity as a whole could be derived
from all verifiable claims associated with a given identity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the age of increasing digital interactions and analysis of
user data, the concept of Self-Sovereign Identies has gained
a large amount of interest. It promises its users more control
and a more user-centric experience that, in contrast to previous
user-centric efforts, does not have to rely on any centralised
entities. The concept of verifiable claims has been extended
by the Identity Registry Model as well as the Claim Registry
Model. These decentralised registries were enabled by block-
chain technology and altough not a necessasity the storage
can be decentralised too. This only leaves the claim-issuers
and their position of trust as centralised entities in the system.
In this paper the architecture of Self-Sovereign Identity sys-
tems has been presented as well as terms further clarified.
Most importantly an analysis of essential components of such
a system was provided.
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